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Considering accident conditions, it is proposed to retain the ballast tanks in their normal sea-going configuration (eg no commoning-up), with temporary covers on the flood grilles which can be removed by divers. The normal GRP covers used for dry-dock work are unlikely to be satisfactory; a special design would have to be developed. The two-adjacent tank accident criteria will not be a problem from the reserve buoyancy aspect, but could give unacceptable heel or trim for towing. Again, this can only be established by hydrostatic calculations, but the only probable consequence is a larger ballast change. Buoyancy bags in the MBTs are not envisaged as being required.

5. SECURITY

Security would depend entirely upon the integrity of the pressure hull and upon the location of the storage site. The hull could not be breached at this depth without the use of high technology cutting and diving equipment, which would involve an extensive surface support facility. No internal precautions should therefore be necessary in removing sensitive equipment. To increase the security of the RC and Machinery Spaces it is proposed to weld up the aft escape tower hatch and the forward tunnel door. However, if additional assurance was required, then the package of work proposed for sea disposal could be applied to the machinery spaces. An additional package would be needed for the Reactor Plant.

In the case of an SSBN, the security requirements are still under consideration. They may require substantial structural changes to the hull, which would affect the feasibility of the underwater storage option.

Some form of intruder detection system hard-wired to a shore position is considered to be feasible. However, it would need regular checking and maintenance to give reasonable reliability.

6. SCUTTLING ARRANGEMENTS

The MBT venting/blowing arrangements proposed for sea dumping will be required. In this case they will be more elaborate as it is proposed to keep all MBTs separate. For SSNO1 a total of 10 vent pipes and valves would be needed. These would be of smaller diameter than the original design. An internal HPA supply from a bottle Group is not required; compressed air will

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112/C62J/89